The SID Developments CCAA, Side by Side
This page sets out, in one table, what the court filings and the Monitor's reports show about the refinancing offers the SID companies held before filing, who asked for the investigation, what the proceeding cost and where the homes and the money went. Every figure is cited to a court document, a Monitor's report, sworn evidence or the securities regulator's record.
The short answer
The companies entered the proceeding with term sheets of about $70 million and about $89 million, against about $90.1 million of mortgage debt. By July 2026, $10.09 million of professional fees had been paid, about 82 per cent of the homes had passed to secured lenders by credit bid, and the Monitor projected about $800,000 for creditors beyond the proceeds of their own mortgaged properties.
Affidavit of Robert Clark sworn Mar 27, 2024, para 14; Pre-Filing Report of the Proposed Monitor (Jan 2024), s.3.1.1 and s.3.1.2; Fifteenth Report of the Monitor (Jul 21, 2026), s.6.0 para 5 and s.9.0; Thirteenth Report of the Monitor (Jul 21, 2025), s.3.1 paras 6 to 7
The record, side by side
| Question | What the record shows |
|---|---|
| What refinancing offers did the companies hold before filing? | The companies' sworn evidence refers to "the approximately $70 million and $89 million term sheets received by the Applicants pre-filing". The Monitor later described the financial advisor's "prior mandate with the Applicants, in which it sourced term sheets referenced in the Applicants' CCAA Application materials".Affidavit of Robert Clark sworn Mar 27, 2024, para 14; Third Report of the Monitor (Apr 2024), s.5.0 para 8(b) |
| How long had the companies been seeking a refinancing? | At filing the court recorded that the companies had been trying since August 2023, with a professional financial advisor, "to obtain a comprehensive refinancing solution for their funded indebtedness".Endorsement of Justice Kimmel (Jan 23, 2024), para 8 |
| How much mortgage debt was there at filing? | About $81.5 million of first mortgages and about $8.6 million of second mortgages, about $90.1 million in all.Pre-Filing Report of the Proposed Monitor (Jan 2024), s.3.1.1 and s.3.1.2 |
| How do the offers compare with that debt? | The larger term sheet is about 99 per cent of the mortgage debt figure and the smaller about 78 per cent. The percentages are this site's arithmetic. A term sheet is an offer, not a completed financing. The proceeding ended in sales and credit bids, not a refinancing.Affidavit of Robert Clark sworn Mar 27, 2024, para 14; Pre-Filing Report of the Proposed Monitor (Jan 2024), s.3.1.1 and s.3.1.2; Thirteenth Report of the Monitor (Jul 21, 2025), s.3.1 paras 6 to 7 |
| What did the Monitor say about a sale at the start of the proceeding? | In January 2024 the Monitor wrote that "a sale of the Properties will result in depressed recoveries for Investors and/or will take several years to complete". It wrote that the DIP financing "will allow the Applicants to refinance or restructure, which is a superior result to a multi-year liquidation".First Report of the Monitor (Jan 29, 2024), s.5.1 and s.5.4 |
| Who asked for the investigation? | The court recorded that the Monitor's investigation powers were "requested by the Secured Lenders and supported by all other parties".Endorsement of Justice Kimmel (Feb 15, 2024), para 10 |
| What did the investigation report as personal spending? | The Monitor's figure for spending that "appear[s] personal in nature" is "in excess of $1 million" over five years, which is 1.4 per cent of the $69.7 million of disbursements it reviewed, and under 1 per cent once the roughly $81.5 million of mortgage proceeds that went directly to the real estate lawyers is counted. The report also alleges that significant funds were regularly diverted to the principals and their corporations, and accepts that some payments to the principals "may have been justified as reimbursement" for business purchases made on personal credit cards.Fourth Report of the Monitor, redacted (Jun 11, 2024), s.2.1 para 3, s.2.5 para 1 and s.7.0 paras 2 and 3 |
| What did the same report conclude about the money used for the homes? | "The funds that were used to purchase and renovate the Applicants' properties do not appear to have been used for an improper purpose."Fourth Report of the Monitor, redacted (Jun 11, 2024), s.7.0 para 2 |
| What did the Monitor and its counsel bill around the time of the report? | For April and May 2024, the two months before the report was filed, $1.58 million before tax. For June and July 2024, fees of $320,391.50 and $825,833.50, a total of $1,146,225 before disbursements and tax.Sixth Report of the Monitor (Jul 24, 2024), s.7.0 para 1 and fee affidavit of counsel, para 2; Seventh Report of the Monitor (Aug 23, 2024), s.7.0 para 2 |
| What were professional fees before the filing, and during it? | The Monitor's table of the companies' disbursements from March 2019 to January 2024 shows $756,000 of professional fees. The Monitor's cash table shows $10.09 million of professional fees and $1.99 million of DIP lender interest and fees paid from January 2024 to July 2, 2026.Fourth Report of the Monitor, redacted (Jun 11, 2024), s.2.5 para 1; Fifteenth Report of the Monitor (Jul 21, 2026), s.5.0 and s.9.0 |
| How much debt service did the companies pay before filing? | $24.69 million from March 2019 to January 2024, on the Monitor's table. It is the largest category of payments leaving the eleven companies, about 43 per cent. Where the money went.Fourth Report of the Monitor, redacted (Jun 11, 2024), s.2.5 para 1 |
| Who dealt with the investors? | The Ontario Securities Commission settlement records that the broker's statements to investors were "false and misleading" and that the borrowers "had little to no communication with the Investors". The Capital Markets Tribunal found that "Drage committed a large-scale fraud". No borrower company was a respondent.OSC Settlement Agreement, Claire Drage et al. (Dec 16, 2025), paras 17, 39 and 52; Capital Markets Tribunal reasons, 2026 ONCMT 1 (Jan 16, 2026), para 8 |
| Who proposed counsel for the lenders? | The Initial Order, made on the companies' application, appointed representative counsel for the lenders. In March 2024, on the appointment of counsel for the unsecured lenders, the court recorded that "the Monitor understands that the Applicants support" the appointment.Endorsement of Justice Kimmel (Jan 23, 2024), paras 40 to 45; Endorsement of Justice Kimmel (Mar 28, 2024), para 5(f) |
| What did the companies propose for the lenders in June 2024? | The companies' sworn evidence is that each of their proposed frameworks contemplated "the pro rata distribution of 70% of the common equity of NewCo to the Secured Lenders and 30% of the common equity of NewCo to the Unsecured Lenders, in each case, up to a valuation of $140 million".Motion Record of the Applicants (Jun 20, 2024), including the affidavit of Robert Clark, Clark affidavit para 42 |
| What did the secured lenders' representatives propose in February 2024? | The companies' sworn evidence is that on February 23, 2024 the lender representatives submitted a letter of intent, "without the knowledge of the Unsecured Lenders", for a purchase price intended to reflect the principal of the first and second mortgage loans and "5% of the principal advanced under the Applicants' unsecured Promissory Notes".Motion Record of the Applicants (Jun 20, 2024), including the affidavit of Robert Clark, Clark affidavit para 25(a) |
| Where did the homes go? | 333 properties, about 82% of the portfolio, went to secured lenders by credit bid, in exchange for their mortgage claims plus a cash allocation. In November 2024 the Monitor understood that 186 of the 323 credit bids then received "have been assigned to and/or will ultimately be acquired by Big North Capital Limited Partnership". The court described Big North as "a vehicle created by a number of Secured Lenders to finance and hold a number of the Properties in an efficient manner". The Monitor wrote: "Given that these are private transactions among the Secured Lenders, the Monitor was not involved in such transactions or the underlying arrangements."Thirteenth Report of the Monitor (Jul 21, 2025), s.3.1 paras 6 to 7; Tenth Report of the Monitor (Nov 29, 2024), s.4.1 para 3; Endorsement of Justice Osborne (Dec 6, 2024), para 21; Eleventh Report of the Monitor (Feb 20, 2025), s.6.2 para 1 |
| How were the credit bids priced? | The Monitor's report states: "The Purchase Price is equal to the Mortgage Indebtedness Amount, which is an amount between (a) the Purchaser's first-ranking mortgage principal amount, and (b) the full amount owed, inclusive of accrued interest, fees and costs, plus the Priority Payables." The purchase agreements provide for "no adjustments to the Purchase Price at Closing, including in respect of any deposits, rental arrears under the Leases and/or unpaid property taxes".Tenth Report of the Monitor (Nov 29, 2024), s.4.1 para 3 |
| Were the homes appraised for the credit bids? | The Monitor reports 16 "Equity Properties", and says there was "some degree of subjectivity" in determining them. Eight credit bids were submitted on those properties, and "the Monitor obtained appraisals for those eight Equity Properties, which the Monitor believes is a more reflective measure of current market value than the Applicants' acquisition cost". The appraisals the report describes are for those eight.Tenth Report of the Monitor (Nov 29, 2024), s.4.5 paras 1 to 4 |
| Were the mortgages independently checked? | The Monitor reports that it cross-referenced the mortgagee named on each credit bid to the registered mortgagee of the property. It states: "Given the funding constraints, the Monitor did not obtain an independent legal opinion on the validity of the 323 mortgages subject to the Credit Bid APAs."Tenth Report of the Monitor (Nov 29, 2024), s.4.1 para 4 |
| What did the Monitor and the court say about the credit bids? | The Monitor: "the consideration to be received under the Credit Bid APAs is fair and reasonable in the circumstances". The court: the result "is fair and reasonable and represents the best outcome in what is a most unfortunate set of circumstances".Factum of the Monitor (Dec 4, 2024), para 22; Endorsement of Justice Osborne (Dec 6, 2024), para 20 |
| What is projected for creditors beyond their own mortgaged properties? | The Monitor projects "approximately $800,000 not included in the Mortgaged Property Proceeds available for distribution to creditors". It expects the principal amount of claims on the promissory notes and mortgage deficiencies "to exceed $50 million (and may be substantially more)". That is at most about 1.6 per cent, on this site's arithmetic. Claims are limited to principal.Fifteenth Report of the Monitor (Jul 21, 2026), s.6.0 para 5 and s.6.3 para 3(c); Claims Procedure Order (Jul 30, 2026), para 15 |
| What were professional fees over the same proceeding? | $10.09 million of professional fees was paid from January 2024 to July 2, 2026.Fifteenth Report of the Monitor (Jul 21, 2026), s.9.0 |
What the reports do not state
The Monitor's reports do not state a total value for the properties transferred to secured lenders by credit bid, so the table above is not a measure of every lender's recovery.
The numbers beside the headlines · Cost of the CCAA · The sale and the buyers · Where the money went · Who raised the money · Why control passed to the Monitor
What cuts the other way
- A term sheet is an offer, not a completed financing. The proceeding ended in sales and credit bids. Thirteenth Report of the Monitor (Jul 21, 2025), s.3.1 paras 6 to 7
- On December 6, 2024 the court found the companies' $140M valuation of the portfolio "not credible". Endorsement of Justice Osborne (Dec 6, 2024), paras 10 to 11
- The Monitor's Fourth Report alleges that significant funds were regularly diverted to the principals and their corporations. Fourth Report of the Monitor, redacted (Jun 11, 2024), s.7.0 para 2
- The fees of the Monitor and its counsel were approved by the court, and on December 6, 2024 the motion that included the fee approval "was unopposed". Endorsement of Justice Osborne (Dec 6, 2024), paras 3(g), 7, 29 and 37